Jewish%20thought for Menachot 34:10

לא דכולי עלמא כרת ליכא והכא ג' מחלוקת בדבר ת"ק סבר בהנך פליגי להניח דברי הכל כשר

The first Tanna<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sc. R. Judah. In cur. edd. 'R. Judah' is also found in the text; evidently an explanatory gloss.');">¹⁵</span> is of the opinion that in the case of 'leaving'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the second clause of the abovementioned Baraitha, where there was an intention of leaving over some of the blood for the morrow.');">¹⁶</span> [R'Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only, but in the other cases<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., those cases mentioned in the first clause of the abovementioned Baraitha, where there was an intention of drinking the blood on the morrow or burning the flesh on the morrow.');">¹⁷</span> [R'Eliezer holds that] he is even liable to kareth; whereas R'Eleazar comes to tell us that in both these cases [R'Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only but the penalty of kareth is not incurred! - No, all are of the opinion that there is no penalty of kareth involved; but in this dispute there are three different views. The first Tanna is of the opinion that only in the other cases they<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Eliezer and the Sages.');">¹⁸</span> differ,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Eliezer holding that where there was an intention of burning on the morrow what is usually eaten, the offering is invalid by Rabbinical law, merely as a precautionary measure against an intention of burning on the morrow what is usually burnt, in which case the offering would be piggul by the law of the Torah.');">¹⁹</span> but in the case of 'leaving' all<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Eliezer and the Sages.');">¹⁸</span> agree that it is valid. [

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